The first official account of the Habaş disaster, and the one that travelled furthest, is probably wrong in its key technical detail.

Within hours of the explosion at the Aliağa steelworks on 9 November, the İzmir Governor's Office described a ceiling crane breaking loose and falling into an electric arc furnace during liquid steel casting. That framing — molten steel, water-cooled equipment, a 300-tonne crane — is the familiar EAF catastrophe scenario, and it shaped early coverage.

Later statements do not support it. Habaş itself described a fatal accident during planned maintenance work on one of the electric arc furnaces. Governor Süleyman Elban, on site, was more specific: the plant was undergoing a kazan değişimi (a vessel or ladle change), there was no iron and steel production at that moment, the overhead crane dropped, material fell into the furnace, and the explosion occurred when the fallen material struck a natural gas line. Of more than 300 employees, roughly 20 were in the area because the shop was not producing. DHA

Whether the crane itself failed or dropped its load is described differently across the governor's two statements and remains unresolved. What the record does establish is that the molten-steel-contact mechanism implicit in the first account is not the one officials subsequently described.

A casualty count that moved faster than reporting cycles

The figures escalated through at least five official stages on 9 November:

StageSourceDeadInjuredNotes
1Governor's Office, first statement314 (3 serious)~10 reported trapped
1bHealth Minister Kemal Memişoğlu115 (3 serious)Inconsistent with the governor's own count
2Governor's Office, second statement6—One hospital death, two recovered from debris died; 8 still sought
3Governor Elban, on site1015 (4 serious)4 believed still under debris
4President Erdoğan1613 (2 serious)Final reported figure of the day

The SteelOrbis report that seeded this coverage captured stage 2, already two to three hours stale. The rapid revision reflects a genuine rescue dynamic — victims recovered from debris and dying in hospital — rather than official confusion, but it is a reminder that early casualty numbers from industrial disasters are provisional and should be attributed to a specific statement and time.

The asset and what a stopped meltshop means

Habaş Demir Çelik's Aliağa complex is not a marginal operation. Liquid steel production began there in 1987 at 600,000 t/y; the company now cites 4.5 Mt/y of liquid steel capacity, feeding 1.9 Mt/y of rebar and 0.5 Mt/y of wire rod. The site is EAF-based, producing billet for long products.

Habaş Aliağa — reported capacityTonnes/year
Liquid steel (current company figure)4.5 Mt
Rebar rolling1.9 Mt
Wire rod rolling0.5 Mt

Note: Habaş's corporate pages have historically also cited 3.0 Mt/y for the meltshop; the 4.5 Mt figure appears in the 2024 sustainability report and current site pages. Capacity definitions differ between pages.

The relevant point for the market is narrower than the headline capacity. Because the affected furnace was already down for maintenance, the immediate production loss is bounded by whatever portion of the meltshop was idled for the vessel change — not by 4.5 Mt/y. The larger risk is the duration of the judicial and administrative investigation and any regulatory order affecting crane operations or gas infrastructure in the steel shop. Turkish long-product producers are already operating in a weak domestic construction market; a multi-week outage at one of the country's larger EAF mills would tighten regional billet and rebar availability modestly, but is unlikely on its own to move national prices materially. (Analysis)

The safety question the industry should be asking

Crane-and-gas-line failures are not exotic. EAF shops are dense with overhead cranes handling ladles, scrap buckets and refractory; natural gas is piped through the melt shop for burners and preheating. A dropped load during a vessel change is precisely the kind of event that maintenance procedures are meant to make impossible — and precisely the kind that occurs when the shop is quiet, with fewer people present but also with less operational oversight than during a casting sequence.

That roughly 20 of 300-plus employees were in the area is the reason the toll was not far higher. It also means the incident will be scrutinised less as a molten-metal accident than as a lifting-operations and permit-to-work failure, which is a different and arguably more transferable lesson for other EAF operators.

Investigations, detentions and a labour dimension

The response spans several tracks: a judicial investigation by the Menemen Chief Public Prosecutor's Office with four prosecutors and an expert panel on site; two civil-service chief inspectors appointed by the Interior Ministry and a Social Security Institution chief inspector appointed by the Labour Ministry; and five people detained in connection with the incident. President Erdoğan said responsibility and negligence would be established.

Separately, two spokespeople for the Ege İşçi Birliği (Aegean Workers' Union) were detained while attempting to make a statement outside Aliağa State Hospital. That detail sits outside the technical narrative but is likely to feature in the labour and accountability debate that follows.

What to watch

The crane's maintenance and inspection record, and whether load-shedding was mechanical or procedural, will determine where liability lands. For the wider industry, the useful signal is the finding on gas-line routing and isolation during furnace maintenance — a hazard that is common to virtually every EAF shop and rarely discussed until something like this happens.

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Article status
Published · Version 1
Source date
9 November 2026
MetalMate publication
9 November 2026
Verification
Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed

Explosion occurs at Habaş's Aliağa plant — SteelOrbis