The joint statement published by EUROFER and European Aluminium on 17 November 2026 reads, on its face, as a routine endorsement: two trade bodies welcome the European Commission's draft delegated act listing non-OECD countries authorised to import EU ferrous and aluminium scrap under the Waste Shipment Regulation, and ask for swift adoption.
The endorsement is the least interesting part. What matters is that the two most affected producers' associations have chosen this moment to endorse a list that, on the Commission's own assessment, does not include the destinations that absorb most EU metal scrap outside the OECD — and to spend most of their statement talking about how exporters might get around it.
The legal clock, not the press release, sets the pace
The instrument sits under Article 41 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1157, the recast Waste Shipment Regulation, which entered into force on 20 May 2024. From 21 May 2027, exports of non-hazardous waste — including green-listed metal scrap under Basel entry B1010 — to non-OECD countries become prohibited unless the destination appears on an authorised list.
The Commission published its draft list on 18 September 2026 after assessing requests from 32 non-OECD countries and territories. Consultation closed on 16 October 2026 with 161 replies. The statutory deadline for establishing the first list is 21 November 2026 under Article 41(3); once adopted, the delegated act faces a two-month scrutiny period in the European Parliament and Council, extendable by a further two months. The list is to be revised at least every two years, and excluded countries may reapply.
That timeline is the practical heart of the story. The gap between the 21 November deadline and the 21 May 2027 prohibition leaves a window of roughly six months in which exporters, traders and destination smelters must re-paper flows that in some cases have run for decades.
What the draft actually offers metal scrap
According to the draft annex and the Commission's supporting assessment, only a small group of non-OECD destinations is proposed for metal-bearing waste streams. The picture for the main green-listed metal codes is roughly as follows (draft status as of November 2026; scope may still change before adoption):
| Destination | Proposed coverage for metal scrap | Notable conditions |
|---|---|---|
| Serbia | B1010, including aluminium scrap codes | No notification-and-consent requirement foreseen |
| North Macedonia | B1010, including aluminium scrap codes | No notification-and-consent requirement foreseen |
| Montenegro | B1010, including aluminium scrap codes | No notification-and-consent requirement foreseen |
| Moldova | Certain metal-waste streams | Per Commission assessment and BIR summary |
| Ukraine | Non-ferrous metal codes, excluding 17 04 02 (WEEE-derived metal fraction) | Narrower coverage |
| India | Not proposed for metal waste | Proposed for other waste streams |
| Malaysia | Not proposed for metal waste | Proposed for other waste streams |
Sources: Commission draft annex (Ares(2026)8858290) and BIR member update, as summarised in trade press; treat country-level detail as reported pending the adopted text.
The omissions are the story. India and Malaysia — historically among the largest non-OECD outlets for EU ferrous and aluminium scrap — appear in the draft for other waste streams but not for metal. The authorised metal list is, in effect, a short list of EU-adjacent and candidate-country economies with established, auditable recycling infrastructure and, in several cases, deep existing trade links with EU processors.
Turkey, for its part, is an OECD member and therefore outside this list altogether. The Commission's separate September 2026 work on Türkiye concerned plastic waste under Article 45, not ferrous or aluminium scrap.
Why the associations are louder on enforcement than on the list
The statement's emphasis is revealing. EUROFER and European Aluminium do not argue for adding India or Malaysia; they argue for making the list harder to use and harder to evade. Their specific asks, as reported:
- Whole-chain assessment. Country evaluations should cover not just scrap treatment but subsequent melting operations — that is, whether the destination can demonstrate environmentally sound management through to secondary metal production, not merely sorting and re-export.
- Anti-circumvention monitoring. Shipments re-routed via OECD countries or via approved non-OECD destinations should be tracked, with authorities investigating anomalous shifts in trade flows.
- Waste-versus-product clarity. Guidance is needed to stop waste-classified scrap being declared as a product to escape export controls, including closing end-of-waste loopholes.
- Coordinated enforcement. Joint inspections, independent audits and systematic information exchange between member states, applied consistently to facilities in OECD and non-OECD destinations alike.
This is not a protectionist argument in the conventional sense. It is an argument about verification capacity. The draft list authorises destinations; it does not by itself verify that a given consignment reaches a compliant facility. That gap is where the associations see both environmental risk and competitive distortion: EU recyclers and steelmakers operating under the EU's own environmental regime compete against offshore processors whose compliance is asserted rather than audited.
The classification problem underneath
The waste-versus-product point deserves more attention than it usually gets, because it is not a rhetorical flourish. An aluminium scrap consignment moving out of the EU carries at least four independent classifications that must align: the Combined Nomenclature code (heading 7602 for aluminium waste and scrap), the European List of Waste code, the Waste Shipment Regulation Annex III green-list entry (typically B1010), and its waste status under end-of-waste criteria — for aluminium scrap, Regulation (EU) No 333/2011.
If a material meets the end-of-waste criteria, it is legally a product, not waste, and the Waste Shipment Regulation does not apply to it. That is a legitimate and necessary regime — secondary raw materials must be tradeable. But it also creates an arbitrage: the same physical material may be documentable either way, and the incentive to document it as a product increases sharply as the waste route narrows to five destinations.
A further complication lands on 1 January 2027, when the Combined Nomenclature for aluminium scrap (7602) splits from three subheadings to seven. Finer tariff granularity will improve trade statistics — and therefore the ability to detect anomalous flows — but it will also require exporters, customs authorities and destination facilities to reclassify simultaneously with the export regime change.
What to watch
- Adoption timing and Parliament's posture. Whether the act is adopted on the 21 November schedule, and whether the European Parliament or Council signals objections, determines how much of the 2026–27 planning window remains.
- The fifth metal destination. Industry summaries indicate five non-OECD destinations for certain metal-waste streams; the identity of the fifth beyond Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine should be confirmed against the adopted annex.
- Re-application dynamics. With biennial revision and an explicit reapplication route, India and Malaysia have a structured path back for metal scrap — and a strong commercial motive to build the evidentiary case.
- OECD-route leak detection. The associations' warning about re-routing via OECD countries is the sharpest practical test of the regime. If trade statistics show EU scrap flowing to OECD intermediaries and then onward to non-listed non-OECD destinations, the authorisation list will have created a paperwork layer rather than a control.
For European steel and aluminium producers, the strategic implication is narrower than the rhetoric suggests. The list's restrictiveness supports domestic scrap availability at a time when electric-arc furnace capacity and decarbonisation targets are raising structural demand for ferrous scrap inside the EU. But it also raises the cost and complexity of managing export-oriented recycling operations, and it puts a premium on documentation quality — end-of-waste certificates, chain-of-custody records, destination facility audits — that many mid-sized recyclers do not currently maintain.
The next six months will decide whether Article 41 functions as an environmental safeguard or as a compliance hurdle that trade flows simply route around. The associations have made clear which outcome they expect to be tested.
Source & methodology +
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- Article status
- Published · Version 1
- Source date
- 17 November 2026
- MetalMate publication
- 17 November 2026
- Verification
- Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed

