The 12 November 2026 provisional agreement between Parliament negotiators and the Irish Council Presidency is easy to misread. It is not a reversal of the EU's decarbonisation trajectory, nor a general increase in industrial protection. It is a targeted repair of one specific mechanism — the heat and fuel "fallback" benchmarks — that a mid-2026 benchmark update had made considerably more painful for a subset of installations.

Understanding why requires looking at how free allocation is actually calculated, and, more importantly, at who is not covered by this deal.

What was actually agreed

The package covers installations whose free allocation is derived from the two fallback benchmarks — heat and fuel — rather than from one of the 52 product benchmarks. The headline arithmetic, as reported, is:

ComponentAllowances 2026–2030Origin
Allowances available under existing rules (Commission proposal)~88 millionCommission, 17 July 2026
Previously unallocated allowances added28 millionWithheld under ETS conditionalities
Targeted reserve for highly exposed sectors5 millionNew
Total~121 millionProvisional agreement, 12 Nov 2026

Two details matter more than the headline. First, the 28 million are not new money: they are allowances that would have been issued but were withheld because installations failed the 2026–2030 conditionalities — chiefly non-implementation of energy-audit recommendations, and, for installations above the 80th percentile of the benchmark curve, the absence of an approved climate-neutrality plan. Non-compliance reduces free allocation by 20% under the relevant rules. Recycling this pool back into free allocation is politically attractive because it requires no change to the overall cap.

Second, the 28 million is a compromise figure. The Council's September position would have used roughly 33 million; Parliament, voting 474–82 in October, wanted the unallocated pool split three ways — about 11 million to free allocation, 11 million to the Modernisation Fund (including district heating) and 11 million to the Innovation Fund. Industry associations, in a 26 October joint statement coordinated via Euromines, had backed the Council line and warned the Parliament split would "fail to provide meaningful and urgent relief." The final deal sits between the two institutions, with 5 million carved out for sectors whose benchmarks poorly reflect real performance and any unused portion of that reserve flowing to the Modernisation and Innovation Funds.

The procedure is not finished. Council approval was targeted for 18 November, followed by Parliament in plenary, legal-linguistic review and publication in the Official Journal. The Commission then has to adopt implementing rules for calculating the heat and fuel benchmarks, and Parliament has pressed for sectoral sub-benchmarks by implementing act for sectors where a single fallback value is a poor fit.

The number that actually matters is the benchmark, not the allowance count

The 121 million figure is a five-year total. Spread across all covered sectors and installations, it is roughly 24 million allowances per year. Against the scale of the EU ETS, that is a modest adjustment; against individual installations, the level of the benchmark is far more consequential than the size of the pool.

Parliament's October position indicated that the revised fallback benchmarks would land about 12.5% below 2021–2025 values — indicatively 41.4 allowances per TJ for heat and 37.3 per TJ for fuel. Agence Europe reports the final agreement at roughly 10% below 2021–2025.

That gap of about 2.5 percentage points is, in my reading of the arithmetic, roughly what moving ~11 million allowances from the Modernisation/Innovation split back into free allocation buys you. This is an analytical inference, not a stated position of either institution; the co-legislators have not published the mapping. But the direction is unambiguous: the agreement does not restore the benchmark. It softens the cut.

To put it in installation terms: a site with 1 PJ per year of eligible heat and fuel consumption (about 278 GWh) would see its free allocation fall by roughly 4,000–5,000 allowances per year more under a 12.5% cut than under a 10% cut. At an illustrative €70–80/t CO2, that is €0.3–0.4 million a year of additional compliance cost. Across a five-year period and multiple installations in a group, it adds up — but it does not change investment economics on its own.

Who benefits, and who does not

The critical distinction, and the one most likely to be lost in trade-press coverage, is that iron and steel does not benefit from this package in its core steelmaking operations.

Iron and steel is a CBAM sector. Its free allocation under product benchmarks — hot metal, EAF carbon steel, sintered ore and so on — is being phased out between 2026 and 2038, and this agreement does nothing to alter that schedule. The heat and fuel fallback benchmarks matter for:

  • Upstream heat and fuel suppliers to industry, including district heating operators and industrial utilities, whose output feeds multiple downstream users;
  • Installations or sub-installations without a suitable product benchmark — a category that includes parts of cement, ceramics, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, minerals and mining;
  • Steel sites as purchasers, indirectly: the cost of heat, lime, refractories and ferroalloys bought from benchmark-covered suppliers will be somewhat lower than it would otherwise have been.

For steelmakers, the operative policy questions remain elsewhere: the CBAM phase-out timetable, the functioning of the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank and Investment Booster proposed in July, electricity price competitiveness (EUROFER's repeated COP31-era demand), and the pace of hydrogen-based DRI projects. This agreement is background noise by comparison.

What the compromise reveals about the EU's industrial policy operating mode

Three observations are worth carrying forward.

The conditionalities are now real. The ~28–33 million withheld pool proves that the 2026–2030 energy-audit and climate-neutrality-plan requirements have teeth. Roughly 30 million allowances over five years were withheld for non-compliance — several hundred million euros at current prices. Whether those installations now take the audit recommendations more seriously, knowing the pool has been reallocated, is an open question. The recycling creates a mild moral hazard: non-compliance by some lowers the cost of compliance for others.

The benchmark review process remains contested. Industry complaints focused not only on the level of the cut but on the process — specifically the prospect of new sectoral sub-benchmarks being created by delegated act within three months and on unclear criteria. Parliament has partly answered this by asking for sub-benchmarks via implementing acts based on the average GHG intensity of the 10% most efficient installations, using the same reference period and methodology as the ex-ante fuel benchmark. If that is delivered properly, it could meaningfully improve the fit between allocation and real performance for sectors where the fallback is crude. If it is not, the argument will recur at the next benchmark revision.

The legislative calendar is tight. Co-legislators aim to complete the procedure before the end of 2026, but the 2026–2030 allocation period is already running. National implementation measures and allocation tables have been set on the basis of the June benchmarks. Retroactive adjustment or recalculation for the first compliance year is a live administrative risk that the Commission's implementing rules will need to handle cleanly.

The bottom line

The provisional agreement is a pragmatic, contained fix to a specific technical problem: the heat and fuel fallback benchmarks were set too tight for sectors that have no better benchmark to use, and the co-legislators have found roughly 33 million allowances of headroom — mostly by reallocating conditionalities-forfeited volumes — to blunt the impact. It provides real but modest relief, concentrated in non-steel energy-intensive sectors, at the cost of marginally reducing the incentive value of the conditionalities themselves.

For steel, the message is that the CBAM-driven free-allocation phase-out is proceeding on schedule and remains the dominant carbon-cost variable. Steelmakers should read this deal as confirmation that Brussels will intervene at the margin to protect competitiveness — and as a signal that the same willingness to compromise will be tested when the CBAM phase-out begins to bite harder after 2030.

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Article status
Published · Version 1
Source date
16 November 2026
MetalMate publication
16 November 2026
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EU Council and Parliament agree to increase ETS free allowances for energy-intensive industries — SteelOrbis