Thailand has not banned scrap imports. That is the single most important fact in the news coming out of Bangkok, and it is the one most easily lost in headlines about a "crackdown." What actually exists is a proposal from the Customs Department to the Ministry of Commerce, a review process rather than a decree, and a factory inspection campaign that is already generating visible results. For steelmakers, foundries and secondary aluminium and copper producers in Southeast Asia's second-largest economy, the distinction between "proposed" and "in force" is worth several hundred thousand tonnes a year of raw material.
What has actually happened
Two parallel tracks have opened since late October.
The import track. Customs submitted recommendations to the Department of Foreign Trade (DFT) under the Ministry of Commerce to restrict imports of scrap metal and scrap rubber, after inspections found prohibited electronic waste concealed inside cargo declared as recyclable material. The drafting that preceded that submission, reported on 22 October, would have classified metal and rubber scrap as prohibited imports after a six- to twelve-month transition, during which they would become controlled imports requiring permits — issued only to factories importing for their own production processes, and only where domestic raw material is insufficient — with a pre-shipment inspection (PSI) certificate demanded for every consignment.
Crucially, Customs has said publicly it cannot ban imports or exports on its own authority. The decision sits with Commerce. And the DFT has simultaneously reaffirmed that legitimate high-quality scrap metal for industry continues to be facilitated, even while bans on municipal waste, e-waste, plastic scrap and used tyres remain in place. (The DFT's own summary lists rubber scrap as already banned, which sits awkwardly with Customs proposing to prohibit it — most likely a difference between specific rubber-scrap categories and a broader legal classification. The precise scope should be read from the eventual notification, not from press summaries.)
The enforcement track. A Ministry of Industry campaign put 50 inspection teams — ten per province — into Chonburi, Rayong, Chachoengsao, Prachinburi and Samut Prakan from 1–2 November. The target population is 3,049 licensed waste treatment and recycling facilities nationwide, of which more than 1,500 sit in those five provinces. On the first day, 80 factories were inspected: one was ordered to suspend operations under Section 39 of the Factory Act, 63 were ordered to make improvements under Section 37, and three were flagged for possible closure or licence revocation.
| Metric | Figure | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Licensed waste/recycling facilities, Thailand | 3,049 | DIW categories 105 and 106 |
| Of which in the five priority provinces | >1,500 | ~50% of the national stock |
| Inspection teams deployed | 50 | 10 per province |
| Facilities inspected, first day | 80 | ~5% of the provincial target |
| Orders issued, first day | 64 | 1 suspension, 63 improvement orders |
Source: Ministry of Industry / DIW statements via national media. Percentages are MetalMate calculations.
The numbers behind the political urgency
This is not a speculative regulatory exercise. Customs figures for fiscal 2026 (ended 30 September) put illegally imported e-waste confiscated at 10,029 t, of which 5,290 t has already been shipped back to origin. The Basel Action Network flagged 720 containers during the year; 440 never reached Thailand, and of those that did, 187 were inspected and clean while 89 were found in violation. On 26 October, 15 containers at Laem Chabang Port were detained and physically opened; X-ray screening alone was judged insufficient because densely packed scrap defeats imaging.
The proximate trigger for the facility campaign was environmental rather than commercial: a leachate leak from a waste site in Prachinburi during flooding, with the Pollution Control Department reporting petroleum hydrocarbon concentrations of 114,860 mg/l at 65 m from the embankment against under 3 mg/l at 435 m and 850 m. That is a public-health event, and it explains the political tempo — a three-track plan agreed at a National Committee on Solving the E-Waste Problem meeting on 31 October, chaired by the deputy prime minister and commerce minister, with a 30-day deadline for visible results.
Why the steel and metals reader should care
Thailand is a structural scrap importer. Its electric arc furnace and induction furnace sector, its rebar and wire rod mills, and its secondary non-ferrous base — aluminium, copper, lead — all draw on imported heavy melting scrap, shredded scrap and, increasingly, processed grades from Australia, the United States, Japan and Europe. Domestic generation has never covered domestic appetite, which is precisely why the DFT has been careful to say that legitimate high-quality scrap imports remain facilitated.
The measures under discussion are nonetheless consequential, and the impact falls unevenly across the supply chain:
- Pre-shipment inspection certification shifts cost and delay upstream, to exporters and consolidators in origin countries. PSI regimes are familiar from Indian and Indonesian practice; they raise per-container costs modestly but raise rejection risk sharply for mixed and poorly sorted cargo.
- Factory-only import eligibility would squeeze independent traders and merchant yards that hold scrap and resell domestically. If permits are tied to a licensee's own production process, the merchant segment loses its import channel and domestic scrap prices face upward pressure.
- Contamination thresholds are the real technical question. The committee's medium-term agenda explicitly includes reviewing "levels of admixture" (ระดับสิ่งปะปน). A strict threshold — say, tight limits on circuit boards, cables and sealed components in HMS — would disqualify much of what currently clears as No. 1 and No. 2 heavy melting scrap. Loose thresholds would leave the enforcement problem intact.
- A full prohibition — the option Customs appears to have floated — would be the most disruptive outcome, forcing Thai mills to substitute domestically, raising input costs, and likely pulling in more imports of semi-finished steel and direct reduced iron instead. That substitution effect is rarely discussed and deserves more attention than it gets.
The realistic timeline and the real constraint
The 30-day deadline and the plan to extend inspections to Bangkok and other provinces by December point to a policy decision in the first quarter of 2027, not in November. A six- to twelve-month transition period, if adopted, pushes any prohibition into late 2027 or 2028 — ample time for the trade to adjust, and ample time for the proposal to be diluted under industry lobbying.
The binding constraint is not political will but institutional capacity. Inspecting 1,500 facilities with 50 teams, physically opening every scrap container at Laem Chabang, and running a PSI certification regime for thousands of consignments a year requires staff, laboratory capacity and forensic expertise Thailand does not currently have at scale. The first-day hit rate — 64 of 80 factories receiving some order — suggests either a genuinely non-compliant sector or inspection targeting that pre-selects problem sites. Both readings imply a long, resource-intensive campaign rather than a clean sweep.
What to watch
- The DFT notification text. Whether Customs' proposal is adopted as a prohibition, a controlled-import regime, or a tightened licensing condition will determine everything else. Watch for the contamination threshold figure.
- Transition length and PSI provider accreditation. Which inspection bodies are recognised, and at whose cost, shapes exporter behaviour.
- Merchant trader treatment. If permits are restricted to end-users, expect consolidation among Thai scrap processors and a rise in domestic scrap prices relative to import parity.
- Substitution flows. Watch Thai imports of billet, DRI and semi-finished steel as a proxy for how much imported scrap the system actually absorbs.
- The December extension. If inspections reach Bangkok and the eastern seaboard industrial estates, the campaign moves from the waste sector into the metals-processing sector proper.
The honest reading is that Thailand is trying to separate two things it has so far failed to separate in practice — legitimate recyclable feedstock and disguised hazardous waste — at a port where the physical evidence is packed inside the same container. The proposal is a blunt instrument aimed at a genuinely difficult detection problem. Whether it lands as a scalpel or a sledgehammer will be decided in the Commerce Ministry, not at Laem Chabang.
Source & methodology +
MetalMate separates original-source evidence from summary and analysis. Verify the original source before procurement, legal or engineering decisions.
- Article status
- Published · Version 1
- Source date
- 6 November 2026
- MetalMate publication
- 6 November 2026
- Verification
- Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed
Thailand considers tighter scrap import restrictions amid crackdown on illegal e-waste — SteelOrbis

