The European Commission's first list of non-OECD destinations authorised to import EU scrap is due by 21 November 2026, and the lobbying around it has become openly hostile. On 17 November, EUROFER and European Aluminium welcomed the draft delegated act and called for its swift adoption and robust enforcement. The same day, Recycling Europe (formerly EuRIC) published a rebuttal titled "Europe's metals value chain cannot be competitive at recyclers' expense," accusing the two producer associations of using environmental protection "as a guise" to secure cheaper feedstock.
The exchange is worth reading closely, because the underlying question is not whether Indian or Pakistani shredders meet EU environmental standards. It is who bears the adjustment cost of a regulation that, from 21 May 2027, will remove a large part of the export outlet for EU ferrous and aluminium scrap — and whether the Commission will pair that restriction with demand-side measures or leave recyclers to absorb the hit alone.
What is actually being decided
Under the revised Waste Shipment Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1157), exports of non-hazardous waste to non-OECD countries are generally prohibited from 21 May 2027 unless the destination appears on a Commission list of authorised countries. Thirty-two countries submitted requests by the February 2025 deadline (plus two later additions). The Commission published its draft list on 18 September 2026, ran a stakeholder consultation to 16 October, and must establish the first list by 21 November 2026, with updates at least every two years.
For ferrous and aluminium scrap specifically, the draft is restrictive. Recycling Europe's September response said the proposal "would effectively shut EU recycled metals out of major non-OECD Asian markets," singling out India — which the Commission's own assessment reportedly cannot include in the first list for ferrous and non-ferrous metal waste. Recycling Europe's secretary general, Julia Ettinger, made the point sharply: India may be deemed suitable to dismantle an entire end-of-life ship under the EU's ship recycling list, but not to receive non-hazardous metal waste for recycling.
The trade exposure is real and concentrated
The market context explains the intensity. The EU is the world's largest ferrous scrap exporting bloc: 13.76 Mt left the bloc in H1 2026, up 10.3% year-on-year on a Eurostat/HS basis. Turkey, an OECD member, is the largest single buyer and is unaffected by the list. The exposure sits further down the ranking.
| Destination (H1 2026, ferrous scrap) | Status under draft list |
|---|---|
| Turkey | OECD — unaffected |
| Egypt | Non-OECD — at risk |
| Pakistan | Non-OECD — at risk |
| Morocco | Non-OECD — at risk |
| India | Non-OECD — reportedly excluded from first list for metals |
Aluminium is more exposed still. EU exports of aluminium waste and scrap (HS 7602) reached roughly 1.27 Mt in 2025; India alone took about 383 kt, close to 30% of the total, followed by Thailand and China. European Aluminium itself estimates around 80% of EU aluminium scrap exports go to Asia. An exclusion list that removes India, Thailand and Pakistan from the authorised destinations would leave most of that trade without a legal outlet from May 2027.
The recyclers' arithmetic — and its weak point
Recycling Europe argues that its members produce more recycled metal than the EU market absorbs, with around 20% of recycled steel and aluminium exported because there is no domestic demand. Restricting that outlet without parallel commitments from European manufacturers to buy more recycled material would, in its view, depress scrap prices and undermine the financial viability of recycling operations. Its proposed alternative is a demand-side package: mandatory recycled-content targets in EU legislation, green public procurement and circular VAT measures.
The 20% figure deserves qualification. It is an association estimate, footnoted to a JRC report, not a Commission statistic — and it is difficult to reconcile cleanly with the trade data: 13.76 Mt of ferrous scrap exports in a single half-year implies an annualised flow well above what a 20% share of Recycling Europe's cited ~100 Mt recycled steel output would suggest. The two numbers rest on different bases (gross recycling output versus HS-coded export volumes) and should not be treated as mutually validating. The direction of the argument — that Europe is a structural net exporter of scrap — is securely supported by Eurostat; the precise magnitude is not.
The recyclers' stronger point is structural rather than numerical: an export ban creates no domestic demand by itself. If the EU closes the export door before obliging steelmakers and aluminium producers to absorb the material, the adjustment happens through price. Scrap discounts widen, recyclers' margins compress, collection economics deteriorate, and the volume collected falls — which is precisely the outcome the regulation is meant to prevent.
The producers' counter-argument is not frivolous
EUROFER and European Aluminium frame their support around circularity and decarbonisation: scrap is the feedstock for electric-arc steelmaking and secondary aluminium, both central to the EU's climate targets, and both competing for material in a global market where export demand sets the marginal price. EUROFER has argued since at least 2023 that WSR export rules and the exclusion of ferrous scrap from the Critical Raw Materials Act risked jeopardising EU scrap supply and steel decarbonisation.
That position has a genuine logic: a European steelmaker bidding for scrap against an Indian or Pakistani buyer pays the export parity price, and if exports are liberal, the EU effectively subsidises the decarbonisation of someone else's steel industry. Restricting the outlet lowers the domestic price.
Why the fight is really about rents, not standards
Both sides claim the environmental high ground, and both have a commercial stake in the outcome. The Commission's list is, in effect, a mechanism for transferring margin between two parts of the same value chain. If export destinations are cut, the gain accrues to domestic scrap consumers through lower input costs; the loss falls on recyclers through lower realisations. Recycling Europe's complaint that the producer associations want "cheaper feedstock at recyclers' expense" is a fair description of the mechanism, even if its framing is partisan — and the producers' framing of the same policy as "circular economy" is equally self-interested.
The Commission's difficulty is that neither side's preferred instrument does the whole job. A destination list based on demonstrated environmentally sound management is defensible on its own terms, but it is a supply-side tool being asked to deliver a demand-side outcome. Recycled-content mandates, by contrast, would create the pull that recyclers say is missing — but they impose costs on manufacturers, take years to legislate, and European Aluminium's own published positions favour robust impact assessment before binding targets rather than a single universal mandate.
What to watch before 21 November
Three things will determine how this lands.
- The treatment of India, Thailand and Pakistan for metal streams. If the final list authorises these destinations for ferrous and non-ferrous scrap, the dispute largely evaporates. If it does not, the aluminium trade in particular faces a hard cliff in May 2027.
- Whether the Commission attaches any demand-side conditionality. Recycling Europe's call for recycled-content targets and green public procurement has so far found no counterpart in the draft act. Any signal that the Commission intends to pair the list with demand measures would materially change the price outlook for European scrap.
- Whether the end-of-waste status of compliant recyclates is challenged. Recycling Europe accuses the producer associations of casting doubt on end-of-waste status to keep recyclers positioned as "waste suppliers." If that status is eroded, the export list becomes secondary — material that is still legally waste faces far heavier shipment controls regardless of destination.
For scrap consumers, the practical implication is a likely widening of the European discount to export parity on grades with heavy non-OECD exposure, partially offset by continued tightness in OECD-bound flows. For recyclers, the risk is a price-driven squeeze that no amount of environmental argument will reverse once the legal outlet closes. The Commission has until 21 November to decide which side of that trade-off it is willing to own.
Source & methodology +
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- Article status
- Published · Version 1
- Source date
- 18 November 2026
- MetalMate publication
- 18 November 2026
- Verification
- Automated evidence checks; not human reviewed
Recycling Europe warns EU scrap export restrictions could undermine recycling industry — SteelOrbis

