Acciaierie d'Italia (AdI) has crossed a threshold from which there is no clean return. On 29 October 2026 Italy's Court of Cassation (Sezioni Unite civili, judgment no. 28087) rejected the appeals of Ilva and Acciaierie d'Italia against a Milan injunction, clearing the way for the shutdown of the Taranto hot area. The blast furnaces, kept for months in preheating as a holding manoeuvre, were being switched off from 3 November, and by the 6 November meeting on the CIGS wage-support scheme with the Ministry of Labour the company was reporting that all hot-area plant was off.
The timing matters commercially: two binding bids for AdI's entire active business perimeter were filed by the 8 November deadline — Arvedi Group and Jindal Steel International — and both effectively assume a site that no longer makes primary steel from iron ore. That changes what the so-called decarbonisation programme is likely to be, who can deliver it, and what it will demand from suppliers.
What the court decided, and why it is irreversible in practice
The injunction originated not with the public prosecutor but with a civil action brought by eleven citizens from the Genitori Tarantini association — a reminder that in Italy environmental litigation can travel outside the criminal track that dominated the Ilva story for a decade. The Milan Court of Appeal's decree of 27 July 2026 ordered the hot area stopped, citing particulate emissions and the presence of asbestos in the blast furnaces, and it was upheld at hearings in September before the Cassation ruling in October.
Two implications should be separated. The legal one is now settled: the ruling is final, and the case law (precautionary and proportionality principles applied to industrial health risk) will be cited well beyond Taranto. The engineering one is a matter of degree rather than certainty. Trade and general press repeatedly state that a blast furnace that has gone cold cannot simply be relit after months of preheating; that is usually true of furnaces in this condition, but it is a professional judgment, not something the judgment decrees. What is certain is that restarting the coke ovens, sinter plant and blast furnaces would require a fresh authorisation process in an environment where the courts have just found an ongoing health risk.
That is why the preheating-until-15-December legislative measure, contingent on the Cassation outcome, now amounts to little. The decarbonisation timetable that assumed an integral cycle running in the interim — the "transitional" framing used when blast furnace No. 1 was relit in October 2024 — has lost its foundation.
The plan that was on the table
The configuration examined in Parliament in July 2025 was, on paper, one of Europe's largest green steel conversions: three electric arc furnaces at Taranto totalling roughly 6 Mt/year, one EAF at Genoa, and up to four direct-reduction (DRI) plants at Taranto to feed the Puglia and Liguria meltshops, with a parallel DRI D'Italia Memorandum of Understanding for a 2.5 Mt unit. Reporting at the time described a first phase of 2026–2029 (one EAF, two DRI modules) and completion around 2033.
None of that had reached procurement. No EPC or EPCI contractor for the EAFs or DRI plants has been named in any public source, no EAF or DRI order has been placed, and no scrap, pellet or gas supply has been contracted on the public record. The plan was a strategic direction with a parliamentary paper trail, not a set of purchase orders. Readers who track project pipelines should treat the programme as concept-stage until a buyer commits capital and the tender/EPC phase opens.
The sale: two bids, two different bets
The extraordinary commissioners, advised by Project Sider, received two offers covering all active business complexes. The Federacciai-coordinated Italian consortium (roughly 14–15 firms, focused mainly on the cold area) and Flacks Group did not file binding offers.
| Bidder | Core industrial concept (as reported) | DRI | Employment/conditions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arvedi Group | Cold rolling continues first, partly on imported EU slabs; then one EAF using Arvedi's ESP (endless strip production) technology, later a second | Not initially planned; to be assessed later with local authorities | ~3,000 initially, up to ~5,000 with doubling; offer conditional on institutional and Taranto community approval of industrial, environmental, employment and social plans |
| Jindal Steel International | ~2 Mt/year EAF at Taranto plus large slab imports (reported ~4 Mt from Oman in earlier proposals), taking output toward the site's ~6 Mt authorisation ceiling | Not specified in public reporting | Terms not disclosed |
These are press reconstructions, not published bid documents; the commissioners have disclosed neither bid values nor financing. Two caveats matter. First, it is unclear how much of Jindal's earlier Oman-slab concept survived into the November offer. Second, Arvedi's conditions are suspensive, so its bid is not a commitment at this stage.
Reading the industrial logic
Both bidders converge on the same sequence: restart the finishing lines on bought semi-finished steel, and add electric steelmaking afterwards. That is the fastest way to preserve the cold-end assets and employment while the hot end is gone — but it makes Taranto, for a period, an importer of slabs rather than a producer of them.
For Jindal, imported slabs from Oman would help fill a 2 Mt EAF and approach the site's existing environmental ceiling — an unusual model for a European integrated site and one that raises questions about the sustainability and cost of long-haul slab supply. For Arvedi, ESP is a known, in-house technology at Cremona, which lowers technical risk but also means the equipment is likely to be sourced through an established supplier relationship rather than an open tender. Neither plan matches the scope or timeline of the 2025 three-EAF/four-DRI vision.
That gap has consequences beyond Taranto. The 2025 plan implied long-term demand for scrap, DRI-grade pellets/HBI, gas and then hydrogen, and substantial grid connections in Puglia. On the evidence of the bids, the near-term requirement shifts towards slab imports and a smaller electric meltshop. The DRI D'Italia MoU and the H2Loop partnership are now unsupported by an owner with capital, and should be treated as dormant rather than cancelled.
What to watch
- Preferred bidder and conditions. The commissioners are still assessing completeness and compliance. Arvedi's suspensive conditions and Jindal's undisclosed financing are the two largest unknowns.
- Whether a restart of the cold area can be financed and permitted quickly, and where slab supply comes from in the interim.
- Environmental authorisation. If a 2 Mt EAF plus 4 Mt of imports is the plan, the AIA (integrated environmental permit) and its 6 Mt ceiling will be central to approvals.
- Any new EAF/DRI tender. This is the point at which equipment and steel-content demand becomes real; there is no evidence either bidder has begun contracting.
- The criminal track. The Taranto prosecutor's request for house arrest for former CEO Lucia Morselli and two others over emissions and CO2 allowance management is separate from, and unproven by, the civil injunction — but it will shape the political atmosphere around approvals.
Bottom line
The Cassation ruling closed the hot end; the sale will decide what replaces it. The realistic near-term picture is a cold-end, import-fed site with one or possibly two electric furnaces — not the three-EAF, four-DRI decarbonisation hub examined in Parliament in 2025. For suppliers, the actionable signal is that no major equipment package has yet been awarded and the future configuration is still being designed by the bidders themselves.
